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Summary
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts U.S.
civilian space activities.   Its FY2005 budget request is $16.2 billion, a 5.6% increase
over its FY2004 appropriation of $15.4 billion. The increase is primarily for fulfilling
new exploration goals that were announced by President Bush on January 14, 2004.
During consideration of the FY2005 request, Congress is focusing on NASA’s plans to
return the space shuttle to flight status following the February 1, 2003 space shuttle
Columbia accident, the President’s exploration initiative, and the health of NASA’s
aeronautics research program.  This report is updated regularly. 
Agency Overview
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created by the
1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568).  NASA’s charter is to conduct
civilian space and aeronautics activities.  Military space and aeronautics activities are
conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the intelligence community.  DOD
and NASA cooperate in some areas of technology development and occasionally have
joint programs.  NASA opened its doors on October 1, 1958, almost exactly one year after
the Soviet Union ushered in the Space Age with the launch of the world’s first satellite,
Sputnik, on October 4, 1957.  In the more than 45 years that have elapsed, NASA has
conducted far reaching programs in human and robotic spaceflight, technology
development, and scientific research.  
The agency is managed from NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.  It has nine
major field centers around the country: Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA;
Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA; Glenn Research Center, Cleveland,
OH; Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD; Johnson Space Center, Houston,
TX; Kennedy Space Center, Cape Canaveral, FL: Langley Research Center, Hampton,
VA; Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL; Stennis Space Center, in
Mississippi, near Slidell, LA.  The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA (often
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counted as a 10th NASA center), is a federally funded research and development center
operated for NASA by the California Institute of Technology.   Goddard Space Flight
Center manages the Goddard Institute of Space Studies (New York, NY), the Independent
Validation and Verification  Facility (Fairmont, WV); and the Wallops Flight Facility
(Wallops, VA). Ames Research Center manages  Moffett Federal Airfield, Mountain
View, CA.  Johnson Space Center manages the White Sands Test Facility, White Sands,
NM.  Web links are at [http://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/OrganizationIndex.html].
NASA employs approximately 19,000 civil servants (full time equivalents), and 40,000
contractors and grantees working at or near NASA centers.  For more information on
NASA’s workforce, see [http://nasapeople.nasa.gov/workforce/default.htm].
Mr. Sean O’Keefe became Administrator of NASA in December 2001.   NASA
headquarters is organized into seven “strategic enterprises” that correspond to NASA’s
major programs and are often referred to by their mail codes: Aeronautics (Code R),
Biological and Physical Research (Code U), Earth Science (Code Y), Exploration Systems
(Code T), Space Flight (Code M), Space Science (Code S), and Education (Code N).
NASA’s main website is [http://www.nasa.gov]. A NASA headquarters’ website
[http://www.hq.nasa.gov/hq/org.html] has links to the various NASA program offices,
and from those sites, to individual NASA programs.
NASA’s FY2005 Budget Request
Table 1: NASA’s FY2005 Budget Request
(In $ millions)




    Space Science 4,007 3,971 4,138
    Earth Science 1,552 1,613 1,485
    Biological & Physical Research  973 985 1,049
    Aeronautics  959 1,034 919
    Education    170 226 169
Exploration Capabilities** 7,782 7,521 8,456
     Exploration Systems** 1,673 1,646 1,782
         Space Launch Initiative 1,065 † †
         Other   607 † †
         Human & Robotic Technology † 679 1,094
         Transportation Systems † 967 689
     Space Flight 6,110 5,875 6,674
         Space Station* 1,707 1,498 1,863
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Category FY2004 Request FY2004 approp. FY2005 Request
         Space Shuttle 3,968 3,945 4,319
        Space Flight Support 434 432 492
Inspector General 26 27 28
Total 15,469 15,378 16,244
Source: NASA FY2004 and FY2005 budget justifications. Column totals may not add due to rounding. 
* Does not include funding for research conducted aboard the space station, which is embedded in the
Biological and Physical Research line.  For FY2004, it is $578 million, making the total FY2004 space
station request $2,285 million and final appropriation $2,085 million.  For FY2005, it is  $549 million,
making the total space station request $2,412 million. 
** In FY2004, “Exploration, Science & Aeronautics” was called “Science, Aeronautics and Exploration”;
“Exploration Capabilities” was called “Space Flight Capabilities”; and “Exploration Systems” was called
“Crosscutting Technologies.”
† In FY2005, NASA is proposing cancellation of the Space Launch Initiative (SLI). Funding appropriated
for SLI would be reallocated to activities in support of President Bush’s exploration initiative.
For FY2005, NASA is requesting $16.2 billion, a 5.6% increase over its FY2004
appropriation of $15.4 billion (adjusted for the across-the-board rescission).  NASA’s
transition to full cost accounting and changes to its budget structure in FY2004  (see CRS
Report RL31821) make comparisons further back than FY2004 difficult.  The budget is
again slightly modified in FY2005 (see footnotes to Table 1).
Key Issues for Congress
NASA is facing a number of issues as it copes with the 2003 loss of the space shuttle
Columbia, and the challenges of a new exploration initiative announced by President
Bush in January 2004.  Following are a few of the key issues Congress is considering as
it reviews NASA’s FY2005 budget request.
Return to Flight of the Space Shuttle   
The space shuttle Columbia disintegrated as it returned to Earth on February 1, 2003;
all seven astronauts aboard were killed.  NASA and its contractors are working to resume
shuttle launches as soon as possible, consistent with ensuring the shuttle is as safe as
possible. See CRS Report RS21408 for more on Columbia and “Return to Flight” (RTF).
In the FY2005 budget request, shuttle funding would rise from $4 billion to $4.3 billion.
One issue involved RTF is whether schedule pressure could influence shuttle program
managers to take shortcuts, and if President Bush’s new exploration initiative (see below)
adds to that pressure.   In 2003, some NASA officials referred to a sense of urgency to
resume shuttle flights in order to continue construction of the International Space Station
(ISS, see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).  Now, President Bush has called for ISS construction
to be completed by 2010, at which point the shuttle system would be retired.  NASA
estimates that 25-30 shuttle launches are required to achieve that milestone.  By ending
the shuttle program, funds would be freed for the President’s exploration initiative.
NASA’s FY2005 request includes “out-year” projections  that reduce the shuttle budget
by $1.5 billion in FY2008 and FY2009 to help pay for the exploration initiative.  The
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) cited schedule pressure as one factor in
the Columbia tragedy.  It also noted that funding was taken from the shuttle budget over
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several years to pay for other NASA programs, particularly ISS.  NASA’s willingness to
slip RTF, most recently to March/April 2005, suggests to some that NASA is proceeding
cautiously, but the agency’s plan to launch 25-30 flights in less than six years makes
others continue to worry that an environment similar to that prior to Columbia is being
recreated.  An additional issue is that CAIB recommended that the shuttle be recertified
if it is to be used beyond 2010. If construction of ISS slips beyond 2010, the question is
whether recertification still would be required, and if so, how much that would cost. 
President Bush’s New Exploration Initiative   
On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush made a major space policy address
in which he directed that NASA reorient its activities to achieve a new goal: return
astronauts to the Moon in the 2015-2020 time frame, and someday send them to Mars and
“worlds beyond” (see CRS Report RS21720.  To accomplish that goal, NASA would
terminate the shuttle program in 2010 (discussed above); build a new Crew Exploration
Vehicle (CEV) able to take astronauts to Earth orbit by 2014 and eventually to the Moon;
restructure the U.S. ISS-based research program to support only life sciences research
associated with achieving the exploration goal, rather than the broadly-based
multidisciplinary research program that was planned; and build robotic probes as
“trailblazers” for the astronauts.  The President invited other countries to join.  The
opportunity is not limited to those who are partners with the United States in the ISS
program (Canada, Europe, Japan, and Russia).  Between 2010 when the shuttle is
terminated, and 2014 when the CEV is expected to be ready, U.S. astronauts would have
to rely on Russia to travel to and from the space station.
How Much Will it Cost?   Initially, the President and NASA did not provide cost
estimates for returning to the Moon or going to Mars, only budget estimates for FY2005-
FY2009, and a budget chart (the so-called “sand chart,” see below) extending to FY2020,
which they emphasized was intended to demonstrate there was no “balloon” in funding
past FY2009.  In late February 2004, however, NASA released charts providing some
detail on the budget assumptions behind the chart, including a cost estimate for landing
a crew on the Moon in 2020: $64 billion in FY2003 dollars.   The $64 billion consists of
$24 billion to build and operate the Crew Exploration Vehicle from FY2004-2020; plus
$40 billion for the years 2011-2020 to build the lunar lander portion of that vehicle, a new
launch vehicle, and operations.  The $64 billion does not include the cost of robotic
missions.  A cost estimate for sending astronauts to Mars was not provided.
Is the Projected Budget Sufficient and What is the Impact on Other
NASA Activities?   The President plans to fund the initiative by redirecting most of the
needed funding from other NASA activities, rather than adding significant sums to the
NASA budget.  The  premise is that the nation would spend a certain amount of money
on NASA with or without the initiative, and that money now will be directed primarily
towards the exploration initiative instead of elsewhere. This approach may soften
criticism that the proposal would “break the budget” by worsening deficits and diverting
funds from other national priorities.  The President is proposing that the NASA budget
grow by approximately 5% each year for FY2005-2007, and then increase by 1% each
year for FY2008-2009.  The rate of inflation is assumed by NASA to be about 2% in
those and future years.   A NASA budget chart (dubbed the “sand chart,” and available
at [http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/54873main_budget_chart_14jan04.pdf]) covering FY2004-
2020 was released the day of the President’s speech that shows a NASA budget that stays
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level with inflation beyond FY2009.  Between FY2004 and FY2020, the percentage of
NASA’s budget devoted to “exploration” (both human and robotic missions, and the
development of nuclear power and propulsion and other technologies) would increase
from about 20% in FY2004 to about 75% by 2020.  The total amount of funding
represented in the chart appears to be on the order of $150-170 billion.
NASA’s FY2005 budget materials describe the entire NASA request for FY2005-
2009 ($87.1 billion) as the budget for the “exploration vision,” of which $31.4 billion is
“exploration specific.”  In FY2005, $4.5 billion of the $16.2 billion request is
“exploration specific,” but that does not include the space shuttle and space station
programs that are part of the exploration initiative.   NASA asserts that the FY2005
budget request and its associated projections for the next four years include an
“additional” $12.6 billion for the exploration initiative, of which $1 billion is new money,
and $11.6 billion is redirected from other NASA programs.  However, the “additional”
funds were based on a NASA assumption that without the President’s initiative, NASA
would have been held to a flat budget for those five years, rather than using the out-year
projections that accompanied NASA’s FY2004 request.  The “increase,” therefore, is
above a hypothetical budget that is lower than what NASA projected last year. 
Table 2: NASA’s Proposed Reductions to Fund The New Initiative
(In $ billions)
Activity 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Discontinue SLI -0.8 -1.2 -1.3 -1.2 -1.4 -5.9
Shuttle retirement 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -1.3 -1.5
Eliminate ISS research not tied to
vision
-0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -1.2
Human Space Flight related
reductions
-0.9 -1.4 -1.5 -1.7 -3.0 -8.6
Defer new space and earth science
missions and freeze spending
-0.2 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -2.7
Reduce space technology and defer
institutional activities
-0.15 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.3
Other Reductions -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -3.0
TOTAL REDUCTIONS -1.3 -1.9 -2.3 -2.5 -3.7 -11.6
Source: NASA briefing chart, February 5, 2004.
Redirecting most of the funding from other NASA activities may quell concerns
about rising deficits and neglecting other national priorities, but it subjects the plan to
criticism that total agency projected funding level is insufficient, and that the plan will
preclude other NASA activities, particularly in space and earth science, and aeronautics
research.  At congressional hearings, NASA Administrator O’Keefes responded to the
first concern by saying that if the funding is insufficient, the schedule will be allowed to
slip, rather than increasing the budget.  Regarding the shifting of priorities within NASA,
the agency provided a chart showing where the cuts will be made in FY2005-2009 (see
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Table 2).  One feature of the chart seems to be an attempt to show that the cuts will come
primarily from other human space flight programs, not space and earth sciences.
However, the chart categorizes the Space Launch Initiative as “human space flight” even
though only half of its budget was to support human space flight by building an Orbital
Space Plane.  The other half was for Next Generation Launch Technology to enable a
2009 decision on what new launch vehicle NASA should build. 
Two days after the President’s speech, Mr. O’Keefe announced that no more shuttle
servicing missions would be made to the Hubble Space Telescope.   The decision is very
controversial, and is discussed in CRS Report RS21767.  
What If the New Goals are Not Adopted?   By agreeing to take most of the
funding from other NASA activities, NASA has opened the door to questions about the
value of those activities even if the Bush initiative is not adopted.  If Congress and the
public are not persuaded to embark upon the President’s vision, what direction should
NASA be given for the future?  Is it reasonable to assume that the proposed $11.6 billion
in cuts can be made in any case?   Should U.S. participation in the ISS program continue?
Under the President’s plan, the only apparent reasons for U.S. involvement in ISS are
fulfilling its commitments to the other partners, and performing research associated with
the President’s goals.  If the latter rationale is eliminated, are the international
commitments sufficient to warrant spending $6.7 billion ($2.4 billion for the space station
and $4.3 billion for the shuttle) in FY2005 alone? Are they worth the risk to astronaut
lives inherent in human space flight?  Or are there other reasons that U.S. taxpayers may
wish to continue the human space flight program, such as its oft-cited value in
demonstrating U.S. technological leadership, stimulating children to study math and
science, or satisfying an intangible “desire written in the human heart” as stated by
President Bush following the Columbia accident?
Aeronautics  
Congress has expressed concern about constraints in NASA’s funding for
aeronautics R&D for several years.   The need to reprioritize NASA spending in light of
President Bush’s new initiative may exacerbate those concerns.  Aeronautics advocates
decry a multi-year slide in funding, although this trend has been difficult to track recently
because of changes in how NASA presents its annual budget.  Aeronautics R&D at
NASA was cut by about one-third in the late 1990s, with the termination of programs in
high-speed research and advanced subsonic technology.  NASA’s aeronautics activities
have been restructured several times.  Following President Bush’s announcement, NASA
split the Office of Aerospace Technology into the Office of Exploration Systems (which
will focus on implementing much of the new initiative), and the Office of Aeronautics,
raising aeronautics to “enterprise” status.  Critics have argued for several years that NASA
lacks a clear vision of its goals and direction in aeronautics, despite release of the NASA
Aeronautics Blueprint [http://www.aerospace.nasa.gov/aero_blueprint/] in February 2001
and further recommendations by the congressionally established Commission on the
Future of the United States Aerospace Industry ([http://www.aerospacecommission.gov/])
and the National Research Council ([http://books.nap.edu/html/atp/0309091195.pdf]).
The FY2005 request for aeronautics is $919 million, a reduction of 11% from FY2004.
Most of the reduction comes from eliminating funds for items added at congressional
direction in FY2004. Other changes include a $7 million increase for aircraft noise
reduction and $15 million to fund rotorcraft research.
